This paper examines the nature of mortgage credit rationing across geographic markets and time. Particular attention is paid to the response of conventional mortgage supply to higher risk conditions associated with regional recessions. We develop a series of four indirect tests based on the spatial variation of the FHA share of mortgages, both endorsements and applications, as well as FHA and conventional rejection rates. Results of these four tests indicate that conventional mortgage underwriting criteria do not become more flexible and may even become more demanding when local economic conditions deteriorate. This result indicates the use of non-price credit rationing in the mortgage market and suggests a special role for FHA-insured mortgages as a mechanism for maintaining mortgage credit supply in declining housing markets.
INTRODUCTION
We thank Jan Brueckner, Charles Capone, Amy Crews-Cuts, Peter Linneman, Todd Sinai, the anonymous referees, and the seminar participants at the Fannie Mae Foundation and UC Berkeley for their helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1998 AREUEA Annual meeting. Partial In this paper, we test the nature and existence of non-price credit rationing in single-family residential mortgage markets in the United States by exploiting the institutional fact that conventional lenders, including private mortgage insurers (PMIs), are free to vary conventional underwriting criteria across spatial markets (but not within markets), whereas the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) imposes spatially uniform underwriting standards for all FHAinsured mortgages. 2 Thus, in originating FHA and conventional mortgages, lenders in spatially defined mortgage markets across the United States are free to alter conventional mortgage underwriting criteria to reflect changing economic conditions while also offering FHA-insured mortgages with uniform underwriting criteria.
In areas experiencing an economic downturn, the risk of mortgage lending increases and the percentage of low-risk mortgage applicants falls. The resulting decline in demand for lower-risk conventional mortgages means that conventional lenders must cut prices if they are to maintain their market share in declining areas. Cutting price explicitly, in the form of lower mortgage rates or insurance fees, is inconsistent with observed price invariance over space. 3 Thus, if conventional lenders attempt to maintain their market share in declining (higher risk) areas, they must do so by relaxing underwriting criteria. Alternatively, conventional lenders may maintain underwriting standards and allow their market share to fall as fewer applicants are able to qualify. We develop a number of indirect tests for non-price rationing by conventional lenders in response to local differences in economic conditions, based on the implications of that behavior for the relative shares of FHA and conventional mortgage activity.
Recently expanded Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting requirements covering virtually all mortgage banking firms allow for the observation of spatial variation in patterns of applications, endorsements, and rejections for both conventional and FHA mortgages.
Supplementing HMDA data with FHA internal records allows us to characterize the risk structure of FHA endorsements. Thus, for the first time, we can test a number of hypotheses concerning 2 The GAO [18] notes that, under FHA program guidelines, FHA mortgage underwriting criteria and premium structure do not deviate across geographic locations. Although conventional lenders and PMI maintain spatially uniform pricing structures (Duca and Rosenthal [8] ), they may vary underwriting criteria spatially. The FHA may vary underwriting guidelines to a limited extent in response to Presidential decrees following natural disasters; however, these variations are highly localized.
the nature of credit rationing by conventional mortgage lenders. We also find that substantial variation in the FHA's share of mortgage activity persists even after adjusting for the effects of the FHA loan limits and for the institutional composition of local mortgage markets.
We are not aware of any previous similar study of FHA market shares that considers the full range of applications, endorsements, and rejections analyzed here. However, there is a literature on FHA mortgage choice that relies on survey microdata from the American Housing Survey (AHS), the Survey of Consumer Finances, or similar surveys. 4 Because these surveys examine relatively few new mortgages each year in each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) studies using them cannot evaluate spatial variation in credit rationing behavior between FHA and conventional lenders. Indeed, these studies implicitly assume that underwriting criteria do not vary spatially.
We devise a series of tests designed to detect the nature of credit rationing for conventional mortgages in spatially distinct mortgage markets, specifically MSAs. In contrast to other studies, Rosenthal [7] and indicate that FHA market shares increase as economic uncertainty increases.
Taken together, these tests provide a substantial indication of the role of spatial risk differentials and credit rationing by conventional lenders in mortgage lending.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING
Following Hendershott et al. [12] , we assume homebuyers recognize that the cost of FHA mortgage insurance relative to the cost of private mortgage insurance (PMI) varies based on loan-to-value and other characteristics, with conventional PMI being more (less) expensive for constraints on house value and higher required down payments for the lower cost of conventional mortgages. These arguments are part of an established theoretical literature backed by empirical testing using microdata on individual households. 6 Goodman and Nichols [11] introduce the term "FHA wedge" to describe the group of applicants whose loan-to-value ratio is between 95% and 100% and/or have a front end ratio between 28% and 33%. Such applicants are very likely to be rejected for conventional mortgages but are likely to qualify for FHA-insured mortgages.
Following an approach used by Ferguson and Peters [9] , we assume that all relevant information concerning the applicant's ability to qualify for a mortgage, including credit history, collateral quality, and loan terms, can be quantified by a "mortgage credit score." Credit risk, Φ, is a monotonically increasing function that captures the borrower's probability of default. 7 Each lender sets uniform underwriting standards such that all applicants with a credit risk above a minimum acceptable risk level, Φ * , are rejected, whereas all applicants with a credit risk below Φ * are accepted. The marginal probability density function of an applicant's risk is Φ , and Φ is the cumulative density function.
The probability that a borrower applies for a FHA mortgage is a function of both the borrower's credit risk (Φ) and the lenders' conventional underwriting standards (Φ ). Households with Φ significantly below Φ are very likely to choose lower-cost conventional mortgages. However, some households, fearing possible rejection for conventional loans, apply for FHA insurance, although their credit risk is below the conventional standard (Φ Φ ), whereas other households, less concerned with possible rejection than with insurance cost, apply for conventional loans with Φ Φ . Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] We consider the case of a spatially defined, local market where lenders offer both conventional and government-insured (FHA) mortgage products. 8 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of applicant outcomes in this market. The marginal density function of credit risk Φ is drawn, reflecting the empirical fact noted by Pennington-Cross and Nichols [15] that the peak of the marginal density function falls at a level of credit risk less than the maximum credit risk acceptable given conventional underwriting standards, indicated by Φ .
We note that the fraction of all applicants who apply for an FHA mortgage, Φ , given that the risk distribution of the population is characterized by Φ , is given by
In Fig. 1 , the value of A • is given by S T V. The fraction of all mortgage applications that result in an endorsed FHA mortgage, Φ ; Φ is
The value of E • is given by S T in Fig. 1 . The fraction of all mortgage applications resulting in denial of FHA mortgage insurance,
The region V in Fig. 1 and have an incentive to provide credit enhancements, principally an additional down payment, to qualify for lower-cost PMI. 9 Other applicants are unable to provide these enhancements, and they fall into the shaded region T in Fig. 1 between Φ and Φ , known as the "FHA wedge."
This is the portion of the distribution of applications that would be rejected by conventional lenders and accepted by FHA. 10 We are interested in the effects of a shift in credit risk due to changing economic conditions. A downturn in the local economy causes the probability density function of applicant risk Φ to shift to Φ . Thus, Φ reflects an increase in risk in that (Φ) Φ ∀Φ. We follow Ferguson and Peters [9] in defining an increase in risk as a shift in the risk distribution of mortgage applicants such that Φ first order stochastically dominates (FOSD) Φ .
We develop testable hypotheses about the differential effects of alternative responses of conventional lenders to increases in credit risk that result when Φ shifts to Φ , where Φ FOSD Φ . Specifically, we form a series of testable hypotheses that allow us to determine the effects of changes in the underwriting criteria of conventional lenders and PMI underwriters in response to increases in local economic risk on (1) the FHA share of 9 In fact, many borrowers put just enough down to qualify for conventional financing, thus producing a hump at the conventional lending limit. 10 In essence, these are the applications for which FHA has no competition-the modest share of the FHA wedge applying for conventional credit and being rejected possibly reflects imperfect information on the part of applicants.
applications, (2) the FHA share of originations, (3) the FHA rejection rate, and (4) the conventional rejection rate. 11 Each of these four tests can be rigorously derived based on an analysis of Eqs. (1)- (3). 12 First, consider the case where conventional lenders do not alter underwriting standards in response to an increase in local economic risk. Figure 2 shows this market equilibrium in which Φ is constant, i.e., conventional underwriting criteria are inflexible, or lenders engage in complete non-price rationing. When Φ remains constant and Φ shifts to Φ , where Φ FOSD Φ , then Φ Φ, Φ increases monotonically. It follows that the FHA share of applicants, Φ , and the FHA share of originations, Φ , Φ , increase accordingly.
Because the FHA underwriting criteria are constant, the effect on the FHA rejection rate is ambiguous, because both the share of FHA applicants and the number of FHA rejections increase. This leads to a counterintuitive result-that as the risk distribution increases, the FHA rejection rate does not necessarily increase as well. However, because conventional underwriting criteria remain constant in response to an increase in local risk, conventional endorsements will be lower while the FHA wedge increases. Thus, our theory predicts that the conventional rejection rate will rise. 13 Now consider the case where conventional lenders relax their underwriting standards in response to an increase in local economic risk, as illustrated in Figure 3 . This hypothesis is consistent with the Government-Sponsored Enterprises' (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) charters to maintain mortgage credit in declining markets. Furthermore, conventional lenders have a high ratio of fixed to variable cost, suggesting that they would lower prices (i.e., relax underwriting standards) to maintain market share in the face of falling demand. It is important to recognize that increasing credit risk appears to the conventional lender as a decline in demand because the number of qualified mortgage applicants falls. The impact on the FHA's share of 11 Because part of the mission of FHA is the maintenance of mortgage supply in declining markets, Φ should not change because of changes in local economic risks. Weicher [19] notes that, as a result of the dramatic increase in mortgage defaults during the Great Depression, Congress created the FHA to help restore stability to the housing finance system. Subsequently this role has been interpreted as requiring that the FHA maintain the supply of mortgage credit in geographically concentrated recessions by providing mortgage insurance when local economic conditions deteriorate, and particularly by ignoring risks associated with falling home prices.
applications is ambiguous, because both Φ Φ; Φ and Φ are shifting. However, the increase in Φ will reduce the FHA share of originations. The reasoning is as follows: if conventional lenders increase Φ to maintain their market share, and if total applications are unchanged, and if the FOSD condition ensures that the number of FHA rejections increases (because Φ does not change), then FHA originations must fall by the same amount by which the number of FHA rejections rises. Similarly, if the number of FHA rejections increases and FHA originations fall, then the FHA rejection rate must rise. Finally, we note that the effect of increasing Φ on the conventional rejection rate is ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes the predicted effects on applications, originations, and rejection rates by an increase in local economic risk under the two scenarios for conventional lender reaction to a decline in demand. 14 15 The market shares are calculated for 307 MSAs, and population-weighted averages are computed for the respective HUD Regions during the 1995-1996 period for which extended HMDA coverage is available. Given that the FHA loan limit varies across MSAs, the loan amount needed for FHA eligibility is county specific. 16 Standard deviations reflect MSA deviations in FHA share within 14 The dataset contains all FHA-eligible conventional loans as identified by HMDA, including those originated by subprime lenders. However, because the analysis is confined to purchase mortgage loans (not refinance loans), the number of subprime loans in the dataset is extremely small (approximately less than 1%). 15 Because FHA loan limits vary within each year, we use the weighted average loan limit, where the weight is the number of months the limit is in force, as indicated by a HUD Mortgagee Letter or the Federal Register. 16 The FHA defines loan limits by MSA and country, grouped into high and standard cost areas. All standard cost areas have the same loan limit, whereas all high-cost areas, whether a county or MSA, have a more lenient loan limit. For most high-cost areas, the loan limit is defined as 95% of the median house price, but substantial local office discretion is allowed in setting the 95% loan limits. This 95% rule holds until it is greater than 75% of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) loan limit, at which point the FHA loan limit is reset to 75% of the FHLMC loan limit. All loans in the HMDA data set that have a county identifier are included as part of the FHA market if the loan is less than or equal to the loan limit set for the county. On average, local area house prices increased by 4.3% over the previous year. However, wide variation exists across the country, ranging from a 7.1% decline (Honolulu, HI) to a 12.6%
EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR THE NATURE OF MORTGAGE CREDIT RATIONING
increase (Provo-Orem, UT) over the previous year. Cyclical changes in the labor market are measured by the yearly change in the local unemployment rate ∆ , with increases in the unemployment rate indicating areas experiencing labor market distress. As with the housing market, borrower credit risk deteriorates in areas experiencing local recessions, and thus FHA market share should be higher in areas with increasing unemployment rates. Even during this period of generally robust economic conditions, many MSAs experienced a dramatic increase in unemployment rate.
To measure cyclical changes in the local creditworthiness of applicants, we include the percentage change in delinquency rate of bank loans in the previous year ∆ as reported by the American Bankers Association. 18 The delinquency rate is reported by state and includes all consumer loans (e.g., credit cards and personal lines of credit). Thus, we anticipate that FHA market share should increase in areas experiencing higher levels of financial stress. Based on previous research, we expect credit risk to be higher in areas with higher proportions of younger, lower-income households. We incorporate two income variables measuring these demographic characteristics associated with credit risk. One is the percentage of home buyers with income less than $20,000 (INC < 20). As the percentage of lower-income home buyers increases, we expect a permanent increase in credit risk among mortgage applicants.
Permanent Risk Factors
On average, 11% of home buyers fall into this category. However, the fraction of lower-income home buyers ranges from 0.2% (Nassau-Suffolk, NY) to over 30% (Sumter, SC). The other is the percentage of loans where the ratio of the loan amount to borrower income is greater than three (LTI > 3), which identifies areas with high house prices relative to income levels. 19 On average, 5.7% of home buyers are classified as income constrained by this measure. Again, wide variation exists in this measure ranging from a minimum of 0.1% (Wichita Falls, TX) to a minimum of 51.5% (Honolulu, HI). As the fraction of the FHA-eligible market with LTI > 3 increases, we expect the risk probability density function to shift to the right.
Minority Population
Previous research has indicated that the FHA tends to differentially serve minority borrowers. (Enid, OK) to 74.0% (Bakersfield, CA). In addition, banks and thrifts originate a large segment of loans, since lenders reporting to either the OCC or OTS originate 38.5% of all loans.
RESULTS
We summarize the hypotheses and empirical findings concerning the effect of an increase in local credit risk on FHA shares of applications, originations, and FHA and conventional rejection rates in Table 1 . Estimation results are presented in Table 4 , and marginal effects are presented in Table 5 . Marginal effects are calculated by evaluating the first derivatives of the respective shares with respect to each independent variable evaluated at the overall means of the data.
Thus, the marginal effects provide an indication of the effects that a one-unit change in the respective variables will have on the expected market shares. Because our primary interest is in variables reflecting changes in cyclical and permanent risk, we examine these effects in turn.
Cyclical Risk
Recall that increasing cyclical risk associated with a downturn in the local economy is measured by increases in unemployment ∆ , increases in state level bank credit card delinquencies ∆
, and declines in the percentage change in house prices in the current or previous year (∆ , or ∆ ). We first examine the impact of an increase in cyclical risk on FHA and conventional rejection rates. Consistent with the view that the FHA does not alter its underwriting standards to reflect changes in local economic risk, we see that an increase in cyclical risk certainly does not raise FHA rejection rates and may even lower them. Of the four cyclical risk variables, only the coefficients capturing changes in house prices are significant, but they have opposite signs. In addition, the marginal effects for changes in house prices indicate that these factors essentially offset one another in the FHA rejection model. As discussed above, this apparently counterintuitive effect of local cyclical risk indicators on FHA rejection rates strongly suggests that lenders do not relax conventional underwriting standards in response to an increase in risk.
Turning to the conventional rejection rate model, we also find mixed results for the variables proxying for cyclical risk. Again, the variables for the changes in house prices have opposite signs, whereas the conventional rejection rate is positively related to increases in unemployment but negatively related to increases in the delinquency rate. Overall, the marginal effects indicate that factors associated with an increase in cyclical risk largely offset one another.
These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that lenders maintain underwriting standards, which predicted a positive effect on conventional rejection rates in response to an increase in local risk.
Comparing the FHA and conventional rejection rate models, we find that the marginal effects on the estimated coefficients of variables capturing differences in cyclical risk in the FHA rejection rate model are smaller than the corresponding marginal effects for the conventional rejection rate model. For example, changes in the cyclical risk variables produce a shift between 0.16% ∆ and 1.37% ∆ in the conventional rejection rate, whereas similar changes in cyclical risk variables only result in an 0.08% to 0.11% change in the FHA rejection rate. This indicates that the FHA rejection rate is relatively less sensitive to changes in the local economic environment than is the conventional rejection rate.
Turning to the share equations, it appears that increasing cyclical risk is generally associated 
Permanent Risk
Turning to variables reflecting changing permanent risk, we begin by observing that the most attractive indicator of permanent differences in credit risk is the standard deviation in the trend rate of appreciation in house prices ∆ . The conventional rejection rate and FHA share of originations both vary directly with this indicator of risk, whereas the FHA rejection rate varies inversely with it. This is strongly consistent with the non-price rationing hypothesis.
Expanding our attention to the full set of permanent risk variables, we find that areas with higher historic average delinquency rates have a higher FHA market presence and higher conventional rejection rates. The marginal effects indicate that historic delinquency rates play a large role in altering FHA market shares and conventional rejection rates, confirming our prior expectations concerning the effect of area risk on market share. For example, in New York-New Jersey, an increase of one standard deviation in the historic delinquency rate translates into a 5-point increase in FHA originations and application market shares. Furthermore, we find that a higher permanent house price or equity risk is uniformly associated with higher FHA shares of both applications and originations, which is consistent with the hypothesis that lenders do not alter conventional underwriting behavior.
Turning to the FHA rejection rate model, we find economically weaker effects for our variables proxying for areas with higher permanent risk than in the conventional rejection rate model. As with the cyclical risk factors, this result is consistent with spatial uniformity of FHA underwriting standards across geographic markets. Table 6 originations increase, but slightly less so than for a shock to cyclical risk factors. We also note that FHA rejection rates decline slightly, whereas conventional rejection rates increase. As summarized in Table 1 , the empirical findings generally support the hypothesis that conventional lenders hold underwriting standards constant and fail to support the hypothesis that conventional lenders relax underwriting standards to maintain their market share during periods of increased risk.
4.3.

Minority Effects
It is interesting to note that as the percentage of minority households that apply for mortgages in an area increases, the FHA market share of both originations and applications increases along 
4.4.
Regional and Financial Institution Effects
The main contribution of the estimated coefficients of the HUD regional dummy variables is to demonstrate that, even after taking into account variables reflecting cyclical and permanent components of credit risk, minority composition, and the composition of lenders active in the mortgage market, substantial geographic variation in FHA shares and rejection rates remains. In part, this geographic variation may result from differential effectiveness of the HUD field offices located in each region. Consistent with the FHA market shares reported in Table 1 , we see that the Rocky Mountain and Northwest regions have the highest FHA market shares after controlling for area risk factors. It is interesting to note that, although the Great Plains region has one of the lowest FHA market shares, after controlling for area risk factors this region has a significantly higher market share. Based on this theory, and using a combination of HMDA data recently expanded in terms of coverage to include most FHA lenders and data from the FHA system itself, we estimate a series of four simple reduced-form models: FHA share of applications and originations, and FHA and conventional rejection rates. Taken together, these indirect tests strongly suggest that conventional mortgage lending criteria are not relaxed in areas experiencing recession or longer-term decline. Instead, conventional underwriting criteria are either maintained or tightened in the face of local recession, and FHA and conventional shares respond accordingly.
Apparently conventional mortgage suppliers reject the possibility of relaxing underwriting criteria and raising mortgage insurance prices to preserve market share in declining areas. For home buyers seeking housing priced at or below the recently increased FHA maximum mortgage amount, FHA insurance is available to maintain mortgage credit supply during recessions or longer declines. For housing priced significantly above the FHA mortgage limit, the effects of non-price rationing of conventional mortgages may be more pronounced. 
